The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

宁夏回族自治区人大常委会


宁夏回族自治区实施《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》办法
宁夏回族自治区人大常委会


（1993年10月21日自治区第七届人民代表大会常务委员会第三次会议通过 1993年10月21日公布 1994年1月1日起施行）

目 录

第一章 总 则
第二章 保障机构及其职责
第三章 政治权利
第四章 文化教育权益
第五章 劳动权益
第六章 财产权益
第七章 人身权利
第八章 婚姻家庭权益
第九章 法律责任
第十章 附 则

第一章 总 则
第一条 根据《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》和有关法律、法规的规定，结合本自治区实际情况，制定本办法。
第二条 保障妇女的合法权益是全社会的共同责任。国家机关、社会团体、企业事业单位、城乡基层群众性自治组织，应当采取各种有效措施，维护妇女的合法权益。
任何组织和个人都有权制止、检举和控告侵害妇女合法权益的行为，对于有关侵害妇女合法权益的申诉、控告和检举，有关部门必须查清事实，负责处理，任何组织和个人不得压制或者打击报复。
第三条 自治区各级妇女联合会代表和维护各族各界妇女的利益。各级人民政府和有关部门应当积极支持妇女组织的工作。
第四条 妇女应当学法、守法，尊重社会公德，履行法律所规定的义务，运用法律维护自身合法权益，做到自尊、自信、自立、自强。
第五条 对保障妇女合法权益做出显著成绩的组织和个人，各级人民政府和有关部门应给予表彰和奖励。

第二章 保障机构及其职责
第六条 自治区、市、县（区）人民政府设立妇女权益保障机构。妇女权益保障机构下设办公室，负责日常工作。
乡、镇、街道和企业事业单位要有人负责妇女权益的保障工作。
第七条 妇女权益保障机构的职责：
（一）宣传、贯彻有关保障妇女权益的法律、法规；
（二）对妇女权益保障工作进行调查研究，向有关部门提出意见和建议；
（三）组织协调有关部门的妇女权益保障工作；
（四）接受对侵害妇女权益行为的投诉、举报，提出处理意见或建议，督促、协助有关部门查处；
（五）对有关保障妇女权益的法律、法规的实施情况进行检查监督；
（六）办理其他有关妇女权益保障方面的事项。
第八条 妇女权益保障机构的经费列入同级人民政府财政预算。

第三章 政治权利
第九条 自治区各级国家机关、社会团体、企业事业单位、城乡基层群众性自治组织应当为妇女管理国家事务，管理经济和文化事业，管理社会事务创造条件，并通过各种途径和形式提高妇女参政议政的能力。
第十条 自治区各级人民代表大会常务委员会委员应当有适当数量的妇女。自治区各级人民代表大会中妇女代表的比例应不低于20％，其中应有回族等少数民族妇女。
企业职工代表大会的女职工代表比例数，应与本单位女职工所占的比例基本相适应。
企业的工会女职工委员会参加企业的管理委员会。企业领导应当为女职工委员会行使职权提供必要的条件。
第十一条 国家机关、社会团体、企业事业单位应根据本单位的实际，制定培养、选拔妇女干部规划，在升学、培训和提拔、录用干部等方面，同等条件下应优先妇女。
自治区各级人民代表大会常务委员会、人民政府领导成员中应有妇女干部。教育、文化、卫生、商业、纺织及其他女职工较多的行业和部门的领导成员中要有妇女干部。
应当重视培养和选拔回族和其他少数民族女干部。
第十二条 自治区各级妇女联合会及其团体会员，有权向国家机关、社会团体、企业事业单位推荐优秀女干部，有关部门和单位应当重视妇女联合会及其团体会员的推荐意见。

第四章 文化教育权益
第十三条 教育主管部门和学校应当做好适龄女性儿童、少年入学工作。对家庭生活困难的女生可减收或免收杂费，减免杂费的具体办法和减免杂费造成经费缺额的弥补按自治区有关规定执行。贫困地区、回族聚居地区以及寄宿制回族女子中小学，应实行助学金或奖学金制度，帮助家
庭贫困的女性儿童、少年接受规定年限的义务教育。
第十四条 父母或者其他监护人必须保障适龄女性儿童、少年接受和完成自治区规定年限的义务教育。
适龄女性儿童、少年因疾病或者其他特殊原因，需要免予入学、延缓入学或者中途休学的，须经乡（镇）人民政府或街道办事处批准。
第十五条 学校应当同家长建立联系制度。对中途辍学的女性学生，学校和家长应当及时做好学生的复学工作。
第十六条 学校应当根据女性青少年的特点，进行青春期心理、生理卫生方面的教育和指导，加强女生宿舍安全管理，保障女性青少年身心健康发展。
第十七条 学校、幼儿园的教职人员应当维护女性学生、儿童的合法权益，尊重女性学生、儿童的人格尊严，不得有歧视、辱骂、体罚、变相体罚或者其他侮辱人格尊严的行为。
第十八条 各级人民政府必须重视女教师特别是回族女教师的培养工作，采取特殊措施，保证少数民族聚居地区和边远地区的女性师资需求。
第十九条 各级人民政府应当把扫除妇女文盲和扫盲后的继续教育纳入政府教育规划。教育部门和妇女联合会应当互相配合，采取举办妇女扫盲班等形式，使妇女尽快脱盲。
第二十条 各级人民政府和有关部门应当采取措施，重视对妇女的职业教育和技术培训。在职业技术学校（班）中，应开设适合妇女的专业，吸收妇女参加学习，提高妇女的科学文化素质和劳动技能。

第五章 劳动权益
第二十一条 各单位在录用职工时，除国家规定不适合妇女的工种或者岗位外，不得以性别为由拒绝录用或者提高妇女录用标准。
禁止任何单位和个人招收、雇佣未满十六周岁的女工。
第二十二条 企业在转换经营机制，实行劳动制度改革时，不得歧视和排斥女职工。有关部门对破产企业女职工和企业优化劳动组合的编余女职工应当妥善安置。
第二十三条 各单位分配住房、集资建房和福利待遇必须保障男女平等。
对女军烈属、配偶在外地工作的女职工以及35岁以上的独身女职工，在分配住房时应给予照顾。
第二十四条 各单位应根据国家和自治区有关妇女劳动保护的规定，做好对妇女的安全卫生教育和安全技术培训，并逐步改善妇女的劳动环境和条件。
第二十五条 各单位每二年应组织女职工进行一次妇科病检查，对怀孕的女职工应进行产前检查。检查费用按自治区有关规定执行。
第二十六条 女职工孕期、产期、哺乳期，所在单位不得降低其工资或解除劳动合同，不得安排经期、孕期、哺乳期的女职工从事国家规定禁忌的劳动。
第二十七条 女职工较多的单位，应当建立女职工必要的服务设施，妥善解决女职工在生理卫生、哺乳和照料婴儿等方面的困难。
第二十八条 卫生部门应当为农村妇女特别是偏僻山区妇女提供必要的卫生保健条件，预防、治疗常见多发病和传染病。
普及新法接生，积极推广孕产妇系统保健管理，提高住院分娩率，降低孕产妇死亡率。

第六章 财产权益
第二十九条 在婚姻、家庭共有财产关系中，妇女享有与男子平等的权利，不得以妇女经济收入少、无经济收入或者其他理由而加以限制或剥夺。
第三十条 农村在划分口粮田、责任田，批准宅基地以及其他承包经营项目方面，妇女与男子享有平等权利。
农村妇女结婚、离婚或男到女家结婚落户的，其口粮田、责任田和宅基地应由户口所在地的人民政府予以解决，暂时解决不了的，应在调整土地时给予解决，在没有调整土地解决前，原所在村应予保留。
第三十一条 离婚妇女有权处分自己应得的财产。丧偶妇女有依法继承丈夫遗产和携带自己财产再婚的权利，任何人不得干涉。

第七章 人身权利
第三十二条 禁止溺、弃、残害、出卖女婴和遗弃、残害老年妇女。溺、弃、残害、出卖女婴和遗弃、残害老年妇女的，司法机关和有关部门应当及时查处。
第三十三条 公安部门对被拐卖、绑架的妇女必须及时解救，任何组织和个人不得阻挠和向受害妇女家属索取补偿。解救经费由人民政府统筹解决。
被拐卖、绑架的妇女返回原籍后，任何人不得歧视、虐待。当地人民政府、有关部门和城乡基层群众性自治组织应当妥善安置她们的生产和生活。
第三十四条 严禁卖淫、嫖娼。
对卖淫妇女，自治区及银川市、石嘴山市应根据实际需要建立收容教育场所，依法进行收容教育，并组织她们参加生产劳动。对收容教育的卖淫妇女应即进行性病检查和治疗。检查和治疗性病的费用一般由本人或者家属负担。
第三十五条 公安机关、人民检察院、人民法院和劳改、劳教、少管部门应当尊重违法犯罪妇女的人格尊严，保障她们的合法权益。

第八章 婚姻家庭权益
第三十六条 妇女的婚姻自主权受法律保护。禁止包办、买卖婚姻和借婚姻索取财物。禁止用宗教、习俗仪式代替婚姻登记，干涉妇女的结婚、离婚自由。丧偶、离婚妇女有再婚和不再婚的自由，任何人不得干涉。
第三十七条 男到女家结婚落户，符合户籍管理规定的，应准予落户，本人及其子女享有与当地村（居）民同等权利。

农村妇女与城镇户口的男子结婚，其户口没有迁出前，原所在村应允许保留户口，并享有与当地村民同等的权利。
第三十八条 对残疾妇女负有赡养、抚养、扶养义务的亲属和单位应当负责照顾。对无依无靠、无生活来源的妇女，当地人民政府应予妥善安置。
第三十九条 保护妇女的房屋承租权。离婚前夫妻共同居住的房屋具有下列情形之一的，可以认定女方享有与男方平等的承租权。另有约定或特殊规定的除外。
（一）婚前由男方承租的房屋，婚姻关系存续五年以上的；
（二）因结婚需要由夫妻双方或一方申请分配给的房屋；
（三）婚姻关系存续期间因拆迁而取得租住权的房屋；
（四）夫妻双方为同一单位职工租住本单位的房屋；
（五）其他应当认定为夫妻双方都有承租权的情况。
夫妻双方享有共同承租权的房屋，离婚时如达不成互让协议，人民法院应根据实际情况，按照照顾女方或子女利益以及无过错一方的原则，作如下处理：
（一）承租房屋为房管部门的直管公房，由女方或抚养子女的一方继续承租居住；
（二）承租房屋为单位自管公房，原则上产权属哪一方单位的，由哪一方居住。夫妻居住男方单位的房屋，女方无房居住的，可由女方居住一定期限。双方是同一单位的，其住房应由女方或抚养子女的一方居住；
（三）承租房屋为私房的，由确有困难的女方或抚养子女的一方继续承租；
（四）女方迁出另租房屋的，男方可以给女方适当的经济补偿。
第四十条 男方因女方生女孩提出离婚的，应驳回其离婚请求；如感情已经破裂，确需准予离婚，男方应负担子女大部分或全部生活费、教育费，同时，在住房使用和财产分割时，要照顾女方利益。
第四十一条 夫妻离婚后，子女随母亲生活的，女方可根据子女利益和生活、教育费用的实际需要以及男方的负担能力，要求变更抚养关系或增加抚养费。

第九章 法律责任
第四十二条 有下列侵害妇女合法权益情形之一的，由其所在单位或者上级机关责令改正，并可根据具体情况，对单位负责人或直接责任人员，给予行政处分：
（一）对侵害妇女权益的申诉、控告、检举，推诿、拖延、压制，不予查处的；
（二）在招干、招工中依照有关规定，应当录用妇女而拒绝录用或者提高录用标准的；
（三）以性别为由强迫女职工提前离职、离岗的；
（四）在分配住房和晋职、晋级、评定专业技术职务等方面违反男女平等原则的；
（五）在孕期、产期、哺乳期内辞退女职工或降低其工资的；
（六）女职工经期、孕期、产期、哺乳期，不按国家和自治区有关规定给予假期和劳动保护的；
（七）划分口粮田、责任田、批准宅基地以及其他承包经营项目，违反男女平等原则的；
（八）在入学、升学、毕业分配、授予学位、派出留学等方面，违反男女平等原则的。
第四十三条 父母或其他监护人未经批准，不送适龄女性儿童、少年入学或使女性学生中途辍学的，由乡（镇）人民政府或者街道办事处对其进行批评教育，经批评教育仍不改正的，可以罚款，并采取其他措施，责令其送适龄女性儿童、少年入学、复学。
第四十四条 招收、雇佣未满十六周岁女工的，当地人民政府主管部门应予批评教育，限期清退，并按国家和自治区有关禁止使用童工的规定给予行政处罚。
第四十五条 对侵害妇女权益的申诉、控告、检举者进行打击报复和对女性学生、儿童进行体罚、虐待、侮辱人格行为的，由其所在单位或者上级机关责令改正，并给予行政处分；情节严重，构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
第四十六条 遗弃或出卖女婴的，除责令领回抚养外，由公安机关没收其出卖女婴的全部非法所得，可并处1000元以下罚款；遗弃、出卖女婴，情节恶劣，构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
查找不到生父母的被遗弃的女婴，可按《中华人民共和国收养法》的有关规定收养或由自治区社会福利机构收养。
第四十七条 侵害妇女合法权益，其他法律、法规已规定处罚的，依照该法律、法规的规定处罚。
第四十八条 当事人对行政处罚决定不服的，可以依照《行政复议条例》的规定申请复议，也可以依法向人民法院起诉。对处罚决定不申请复议，不起诉，逾期又不履行的，作出行政处罚决定的机关，可依法强制执行或者申请人民法院强制执行。
第四十九条 依照本办法所收罚没款项，一律上交同级财政。

第十章 附 则
第五十条 本办法执行中的具体问题，由自治区妇女权益保障机构解释。
第五十一条 本办法自1994年1月1日起施行。



1993年10月21日